Borawick v. Shay: The Admissibility of Hypnotically-Induced Memories by Topham, Kristy L.
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 27
Issue 3 Notes and Comments Article 8
January 1997
Borawick v. Shay: The Admissibility of
Hypnotically-Induced Memories
Kristy L. Topham
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Other Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kristy L. Topham, Borawick v. Shay: The Admissibility of Hypnotically-Induced Memories, 27 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1997).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss3/8
NOTE 
BORAWICK V. SHAY: THE ADMISSIBILITY 
OF HYPNOTICALLY-INDUCED MEMORIES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Borawick v. Shay/ the Second Circuit considered the 
circumstances under which an alleged victim of childhood sex-
ual abuse may testify as to memories of abuse that surface 
following therapeutic hypnosis in adulthood.2 In this case of 
first impression,3 the court held that admissibility of hypnoti-
cally-induced or -refreshed recollections should be determined 
on a case-by-case basis.4 In doing so, it propounded a totality-
of-the-circumstances approach and considered a non-exclusive 
list of factors.5 Using this approach, the Second Circuit found 
that hypnotically-induced recollections of childhood sexual 
1. 68 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 1995) (per Judge Walker). 
2. [d. at 598. "Hypnosis" is defined as an induced sleeplike condition in 
which an individual is extremely responsive to suggestions made by the hypnotist. 
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DESK DICTIONARY 480 (1981). However, in the medical 
field, there is no generally accepted definition of hypnosis. Most authorities agree 
that hypnosis requires at least "superficial cooperation of the subject, the devel-
opment of rapport, and the subject's focusing of attention." Council on Scientific 
Affairs, Status of Refreshing Recollection by the Use of Hypnosis, 253 JAMA 1918, 
1919 (April 5, 1985). [hereinafter Council on Scientific Affairs]. A simple induction 
procedure follows which enables the subject to become responsive to the sugges-
tions of the hypnotist. Thus, hypnosis involves the "focusing of attention, increased 
responsiveness to suggestions, suspension of disbelief with a lowering of critical 
judgment, potential for altering motor control and perception and the subjective 
experience of responding involuntarily." [d. at 1919. 
3. [d. at 598. 
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abuse were inadmissible when uncovered through hypnosis 
sessions conducted by an unqualified hypnotist who kept no 
record of the sessions.6 
Numerous courts have addressed the issue of admissibility 
of hypnotically-refreshed testimony resulting from hypnosis 
specifically used to retrieve or enhance a memory of a particu-
lar known or suspected event.7 In such cases, courts have of-
ten been reluctant to admit hypnotically-refreshed testimony.s 
Scientific literature has not conclusively demonstrated that 
therapeutic hypnosis is a consistently effective means to accu-
rately retrieve repressed childhood memories of traumatic 
events.9 However, in light of the Second Circuit's holding in 
6. [d. at 609. 
7. [d. at 600. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1986) (hypnosis used to 
help criminal defendant recall events leading up to the murder for which she was 
charged); McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1987) (hypnosis used to 
help eyewitness recall more clearly events leading up to a murder); United States 
v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984) (hypnosis used to help Texas Ranger 
identify defendant whom the Ranger already knew to be under suspicion); Little v. 
Armontrout, 819 F.2d 1425 (8th Cir. 1987) (hypnosis used to help a rape victim 
remember her assailant); Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112 
(8th Cir. 1985) (hypnosis used to help driver of car recall whether he applied the 
brakes before an accident occurred); Harker v. State, 800 F.2d 437 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(hypnosis used to aid victim of a shooting in recalling his assailant); Kline v. Ford 
Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975) (hypnosis used to enable amnesia suffer-
er remember details of a car accident in which she was a passenger in one of the 
cars); People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 860 
(1982) (hypnosis used to refresh recollection regarding the subject's claim of rape); 
State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571 (Idaho 1984) (hypnosis used to refresh witness' 
memory in a kidnapping case); People v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513 (Ill. 1989) (hypno-
sis used to more closely recall a license plate number at the scene of a crime); 
State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981) (hypnosis used to identify assailant in a 
stabbing); State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1989) (hypnosis used on a witness 
to better recall details of the criminal defendant). 
8. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 600 (2d Cir. 1995). See United States v. 
Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984) (hypnotically-induced testimony not admitted 
because hypnotized subject knew that person he identified through hypnosis was 
already under suspicion); Little v. Armontrout, 819 F.2d 1425 (8th Cir. 1987) (hyp-
notically-induced testimony not admitted because it was violation of defendant's 
due process rights); Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112 (8th 
Cir. 1985) (hypnotically-induced testimony not admitted); People v. Shirley, 723 
P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 860 (1982) (hypnotically-induced testi-
mony admissible if based on pre-hypnotic memories, otherwise, not admissible); 
People v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513 (Ill. 1989) (hypnotically-induced testimony other 
than that of the defendant not admitted); State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981) 
(hypnotically-induced testimony not admitted); State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203 (Utah 
1989) (hypnotically-induced testimony not admitted). 
9. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 606-607 (2nd Cir. 1995). According to the 
2
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Borawick, courts may be more flexible in their approach to the 
admissibility question concerning memories refreshed through 
hypnosis. 10 
This Note will trace the facts and history of the Borawick 
case. ll This Note will then discuss reliability problems associ-
ated with hypnotically-induced memories as well as the vari-
ous approaches to admissibility of hypnotically-refreshed testi-
mony.12 An explanation of the Second Circuit Court's analysis 
in Borawick follows. 1s Finally, the Note will critique the 
Court's reasoning and suggest a possible remedy for the short-
comings of the Second Circuit's chosen approach to admissi-
bility.14 
II. FACTS 
Joan Borawick alleged that her aunt, Christine Shay, and 
her uncle, Morrie Shay, sexually abused her in the Shay home 
during Borawick's 1961 and 1964 summer visits. 15 At the time 
Council on Scientific Affairs (See supra note 2), most studies of hypnotically-re-
freshed memory fail to provide corroboration of memories recovered in hypnosis 
and fail to establish that hypnosis was responsible for any effects observed. For 
example, one study simply included subjective impressions of investigators regard-
ing the validity of the memories recovered. Another study found no clear evidence 
in clinical or experimental literature that hypnosis can improve memory. Other re-
viewers found that accurate memories can occur but that hypnosis can also lead to 
false recollections and confabulation. Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 2, at 
1920-21. 
10. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 609 (2d Cir. 1995). Here, the plaintiff re-
lied heavily on the arguments in Jacqueline Kanovitz, Hypnotic Memories and Civ-
il Sexual Abuse Trials, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1185 (1992) [hereinafter Kanovitz). 
Kanovitz argued that hypnosis functions more reliably when used therapeutically 
than when it is used to refresh memory regarding a specific event. She concludes 
that courts should be more willing to accept testimony based on retrieval of re-
pressed memories. Kanovitz at 1213. The Second Circuit acknowledged the argu-
ments made by Kanovitz yet pointed out that no agreement as to the reliability of 
such testimony exists. A~ordingly, the court was unwilling to assume that the 
risks of suggestibility, confabulation, and memory hardening are reduced when 
hypnosis is used for therapeutic purposes. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 606-607 
(2d Cir. 1995). 
11. See infra notes 15-52 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 53-133 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 134-199 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 200-259 and accompanying text. 
15. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 598-99 (2d Cir. 1995). Valerian St. Regis, 
the hypnotist who treated Borawick, testified that while under hypnosis, Borawick 
described episodes of "ritual dancing" involving Christine Shay when Borawick was 
3
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of those visits, Borawick was four and seven years old, respec-
tively.16 
After years of psychiatric and psychological treatment for 
panic attacks, Borawick sought medical treatment for chronic 
physical illness in the spring of 1987 from Dr. Ronald Peters, a 
medical doctor in Santa Monica, California.17 Dr. Peters re- . 
ferred Borawick to Valerian St. Regis, a hypnotist working 
under his supervision. IS Peters believed that problems in 
childhood sometimes cause chronic illness in adulthood and, 
further, that such problems are susceptible to recall through 
hypnosis. 19 Beginning in the summer of 1987 and continuing 
through the fall of 1988, Borawick underwent 12 to 14 hypno-
therapy sessions with St. RegiS.20 Before and immediately 
after these sessions, Borawick had no recollection of any abuse 
by the Shays or by anyone else.21 
Although St. Regis attended and gave lectures on the topic 
of hypnosis, and belonged to several recognized professional 
organizations centered on hypnosis, he did not hold a medical 
degree and had no education beyond high school. 22 He was not 
licensed in California as a clinical psychologist23 and was not 
four years old, anal and vaginal object penetration by Christine Shay, and anal 
rape by Morrie Shay. Id. at 599. 
16. Id. at 598. 
17. Id. Borawick had been under the supervision of a number of physicians 
and therapists since 1980. During the fall of 1984, Borawick began to experience 
panic attacks. In 1985, she sought and received psychiatric treat~ent for the panic 
attacks on five or six occasions. Subsequently, a psychologist continued this 
treatment from April 1986 to July 1987. Id. 
18. Id. at 598. Valerian St. Regis was 71 years old at the time of this action. 
At fifteen, St. Regis apprenticed with a retired Swiss psychiatrist, traveling in 
search of "faith healers." After apprenticing with the psychiatrist, St. Regis worked 
as a "stage hypnotist" on tour boats, and at nightclubs and resorts. He testified to 
being a hypnotherapist "on and ofT for 50 years." In 1987, Dr. Peters hired him as 
a consultant for the Pacific Medical Center, which St. Regis described as a "rather 
eclectic clinic." St. Regis had his own clinic, the St. Regis Modality Center. 
Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1507 (0: Conn. 1994). 
19. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 598 (2d Cir. 1995). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 598-99. 
22. Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1507-1508 (D. Conn. 1994). 
23. California Business & Professions Code § 2905 indicates that the "practice 
of psychology shall be defined as in Section 2903." California Business & Profes-
sions Code § 2903 states: 
No person may engage in the practice of psycholo-
4
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a member of the American Society of Clinical Hypnosis.24 Fur-
thermore, St. Regis had not previously appeared in court as an 
expert in hypnotherapy.25 St. Regis testified that he kept no 
permanent records relating to his sessions with Borawick and 
that before hypnotizing her he had no expectation as to the 
type of information the hypnosis would uncover.26 He used 
regression therapy to take Borawick back to the time between 
ages three and five. 27 St. Regis explained that he did not use 
hypnotic suggestion but instead asked broad questions such as 
gy, or represent himself to be a psychologist, without a 
license granted under this chapter.... The practice of psy-
chology is defined as rendering or offering to render for a 
fee to individuals, groups, organizations or the public any 
psychological service involving the application of psycho-
logical principles, methods, and procedures of understand-
ing, predicting, and influencing behavior, such as the 
principles pertaining to learning, perception, motivation, 
emotions, and interpersonal relationships; and the meth-
ods and procedures of interviewing, counseling, psycho-
therapy, behavior modification, and hypnosis; .... 
The application of such principles and methods in-
cludes, but is not restricted to: diagnosis, prevention, 
treatment, and amelioration of psychological problems and 
emotional and mental disorders of individuals and group .... 
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2903 (West 1995). 
See also California Business & Professions Code § 2908 which states: 
Nothing in this chapter [§ 2900 et seq) shall be 
construed to prevent qualified members of other recog-
nized professional groups licensed to practice in the State 
of California, such as, but not limited to, ... persons utilizing 
hypnotic techniques by referral from persons licensed to 
practice medicine, ... from doing work of a psychological 
nature consistent with the laws governing their respective 
professions, provided they do not hold themselves out to 
the public by any title ... [incorporating the word "psycholo-
gy"). 
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2908 (WEST 1995). 
24. Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1507 (D. Conn. 1994). 
25. 1d. at 1507. 
26. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 599 (2d Cir. 1995). 
27. Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1507-1508 (D. Conn. 1994). The 
court considered St. Regis' credentials highly suspect. 1d. See also Council on Sci-
entific Affairs, supra note 2, at 1919. In regression therapy, hypnosis is used to 
re-experience feelings associated with a traumatic event. Subjects may behave in a 
manner that seems appropriate for the age when the traumatic event allegedly oc-
curred. Sometimes these events are relived intensely, so that a person may de-
scribe the event in great detail. 1d. at 1919. 
5
Topham: Hypnotically-Induced Memories
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997
428 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:423 
"what happened?,,28 He claimed that during these sessions 
Borawick described episodes of ritual sexual abuse by Chris-
tine Shay and later by Morrie Shay.29 St. Regis further testi-
fied that he did not reveal Borawick's descriptions of the abuse 
to her because he felt to do so would have been "devastating" 
and because he believed that the memories would most likely 
surface in time.30 
Borawick testified that she experienced her first non-hyp-
notic memory of childhood sexual abuse by her father in Feb-
ruary 1989, almost one y~ar after her final session with St. 
RegiS.31 In that same month, Borawick experienced her first 
non-hypnotic ally-induced memory of abuse by Christine 
Shay.32 Borawick stated that her first memory of abuse by 
Morrie Shay surfaced in 1990.33 She also claimed to recall 
abuse by numerous others, including family members and her 
father's friends.34 Specifically, Borawick testified that she re-
called being raped and sexually abused at the age of three by 
men whom she believed to be members of the Masons, and 
that she also remembered being forced to drink blood at a 
ritual involving a dead pig and people dressed in black 
28. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 599 (2d Cir. 1995). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 599. Borawick's father was not a defendant in this matter. Id. 
Borawick had her first recollection of sexual abuse by a family member while driv-
ing in her car after a troublesome appointment with a holistic doctor. She contin-
ued to have additional memories every day or every other day thereafter. Two 
days later, Borawick had a telephone conversation with her sister who was living 
in a halfway house. During this conversation, Borawick's sister revealed an inci-
dent of abuse by Christine Shay. Upon hearing of this alleged abuse, Borawick ex-
perienced a "flashback" and felt like her "lungs were collapsing," causing her to 
"gasp for breath." Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1502-1503 (D. Conn. 
1994). 
32. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 599 (2d Cir. 1995). Subsequent memories 
of abuse surfaced in "bits and pieces." Later on the night of Borawick's conversa-
tion with her sister in February 1989 and at times thereafter until 1990 or 1991, 
Borawick had additional memories of grotesque sexual abuse by her aunt, Chris-
tine Shay. Later in 1990-1991, Borawick experienced further memories of abuse by 
Christine Shay. Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1503 (D. Conn. 1994). 
33. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 599 (2d Cir. 1995). 
34. Id. at 609. The Second Circuit stated that Borawick's testimony was too 
incredible to be believed. The court remarked that Borawick leveled "fanciful ac-
cusations" of sexual abuse against numerous people both familiar and unfamiliar 
to her and that these wild, uncorroborated accusations "erodes [their) confidence" 
in the allegations against the Shays. Id. 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss3/8
1997] HYPNOTICALLY-INDUCED MEMORIES 429 
gowns.36 
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On January 24, 1992, more than three years after her 
final session with St. Regis and almost three years after her 
first post-hypnotic recollections of sexual abuse, Borawick 
commenced an action against Christine and Morrie Shay.36 
Borawick alleged willful, wanton, and malicious sexual exploi-
tation by the Shays in 1961 and 1964 and sought compensato-
ry and punitive damages from the defendants.37 . . 
Subsequently, the Shays filed an in limine motion seeking 
to exclude Borawick's testimony concerning her alleged hyp-
notically-refreshed memories.S8 The magistrate noted the exis-
tence of three different approaches to the question of admissi-
bility of testimony of a previously hypnotized individua1.39 
These approaches included per se admissibility, per se inad-
missibility, and the procedural safeguards theory.40 Relying 
on the procedural safeguards theory, the magistrate recom-
mended granting the Shays' in limine motion, principally on 
the ground that St. Regis lacked appropriate qualifications.41 
While Borawick's objections to the magistrate's in limine 
ruling were pending in the district court, the United States 
Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals,42 which defined the proper standard for the 
admission of expert testimony.43 Borawick moved for reconsid-
35. [d. at 609. 
36. Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1501 (D. Conn. 1994). 
37. [d. 
38. [d. at 1502. 
39. [d. at 1504. 
40. [d. These approaches are discussed at length in the background section of 
this note. See infra notes 53-133 and accompanying text. 
41. Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1508 (D. Conn. 1994). The magis-
trate judge made an initial ruling on the in limine motion on March 24, 1993, set-
ting forth the procedure that would be followed in deciding the in limine motion. 
The magistrate judge issued a ruling on May 26, 1993, after, receiving further sub-
missions from the parties. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 599 (2d Cir. 1995). 
42. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
43. [d. In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that the test set forth in Frye v. 
United States, 293F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) for determining the proper standard 
for admission of expert testimony was superseded by the Federal Rules of Evi-
7
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eration of the in limine ruling in light of Daubert, maintaining 
that Daubert set a new standard for admitting scientific evi-
dence.44 She claimed that the testimony resulting from her 
therapeutic use of hypnosis should be admitted because it 
satisfied the Daubert requirements for admission of scientific 
evidence.45 The magistrate reconsidered the motion and reaf-
firmed her earlier ruling to exclude the post-hypnotic testimo-
ny.46 The district court adopted the magistrate's recommenda-
tion.47 
The Shays subsequently moved for summary judgment, 
which the magistrate recommended granting.48 The district 
court adopted this recommendation and entered summary 
judgment in favor of the Shays on May 10, 1994.49 Borawick· 
appealed that judgment to the Second Circuit. 50 
On October 17, 1995, the Second Circuit affirmed the sum-
mary judgment for the Shays after considering the due process 
and other claims raised by Borawick.51 The United States Su-
preme Court denied certiorari in May 1996.52 
dence. The Court ruled that judges must determine whether an expert's testimony 
is scientifically valid before the testimony may be admitted. The flexible inquiry 
included examination of whether the theory had been tested, whether it had been 
subjected to peer review, what the potential or known error rate is, what sort of 
standards control the technique's operation, and whether the theory or technique 
has been generally accepted. [d. at 585-89. The Court assigned judges a 
"gatekeeping role" for the admissibility of scientific evidence. [d. at 597. 
44. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 599-600 (2d Cir. 1995). The Second Circuit 
did not believe that Daubert was directly applicable to the issue in Borawick's 
case. The court pointed out that Daubert concerned the admissibility of data de-
rived from scientific techniques or expert opinions. However, the issues in 
Borawick were whether the plaintiff was a competent witness or whether her lay 
testimony was admissible. [d. at 610. 
45. [d. The influence of the Daubert decision will be examined further. See in· 
fra notes 190·99 and accompanying text. 
46. Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1509 (D. Conn. 1994). 
47. [d. at 1501. 
48. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 600 (2d Cir. 1995). 
49. [d. 
50. [d. at 597. 
51. [d. at 610. See infra notes 134·199 and accompanying text. 
52. Borawick v. Shay, 116 S.Ct. 1869 (1996). 
8
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IV. BACKGROUND 
Although the American Medical Association recognized 
hypnosis as a valid therapeutic technique in 1958, the accuracy 
of hypnotic recall has no established foundation. 53 Further, no 
consensus exists regarding the ability of hypnosis to enhance 
memory. 54 Generally, scientists fall into two categories con-
cerning the issue of the effectiveness of hypnosis for memory 
enhancement. 55 One group of scientists optimistically regards 
hypnosis as simply an enhancement of the memory retrieval 
process and believes that the brain stores information like a 
videotape. 56 According to this theory, loss of memory is the 
inability to play back that videotape; hypnosis simply facili-
tates that retrieval.57 Another group of scientists rejects this 
theory and views memory as much more complex.58 These sci-
entists espouse a "constructionist theory',59 of memory which 
holds that many factors influence a memory as the brain cre-
ates representations of perceived events.60 The construction-
ists believe that because memory is so malleable, hypnosis 
could actually distort memory over time.61 
53. Council on Scientific Mairs, supra note 2, at 1918. See also Rock v. Ar-
kansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987). In this case, the United States Supreme Court held 
that, on constitutional grounds, a state's legitimate interest in barring unreliable 
evidence did not justify a per se exclusion of hypnotically-induced testimony by a 
criminal defendant. A criminal defendant has a constitutional right, derived from 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Compulsory Process 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
~ incrimination, to testify in his or her own behalf. Further, the court held that the 
testimony must be corroborated and subject to several procedural safeguards. [d. 
54. Council on Scientific Mairs, supra note 2, at 1918. 
55. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 602 (2d Cir. 1995); See generally Council 
on Scientific Mairs, supra note 2. 
56. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 602 (2d Cir. 1995). See also Harker V. 
Maryland, 800 F.2d 437, 439 (4th Cir. 1986); United States V. Valdez, 722 F.2d 
1196, 1200 (5th Cir. 1984); Little V. Armontrout, 819 F.2d 1425, 1429 (8th Cir.), 
affd 835 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988). 
57. Borawick V. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 602 (2d Cir. 1995). 
58. [d. 
59. [d. 
60. [d. (citing United States V. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1200 (5th Cir. 1984». 
This memory evolves over time as additional input is received. Borawick V. Shay, 
68 F.3d 597, 603 (2d Cir. 1995). 
61. [d. at 603. 
9
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A. RELIABILITY PROBLEMS AsSOCIATED WITH HYPNOTICALLY-
INDUCED MEMORIES 
Although scientists differ on the effectiveness of hypnosis 
as a memory-enhancing tool, courts identify several problems 
with the reliability of hypnotically-refreshed recall.62 Memo-
ries resulting from hypnosis are subject to enhancement in the 
form of suggestibility,63 confabulation64 and memory harden-
ing.65 As a result of these phenomena, memories recalled by 
hypnosis can be a "mosaic of (1) appropriate actual events, (2) 
entirely irrelevant actual events, (3) pure fantasy, and (4) 
fantasized details supplied to make a logical whole."66 
A person undergoing hypnosis becomes more susceptible to 
suggestion.67 Further, a hypnotized person may confabulate, 
that is, fill in gaps in a memory to make it understandable. 58 
Suggestibility and confabulation spring from a desire to experi-
ence a successful hypnosis session and to have complete memo-
ries, thereby pleasing the hypnotist.69 Hypnosis can also re-
sult in a phenomenon called memory hardening, which gives 
. the subject enhanced confidence in the facts remembered, re-
gardless of whether the facts are true or false. 70 Finally, after 
62. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 603 (2d Cir. 1995). 
63. "Suggestible" is defined as easily influenced or led by suggestion. THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DESK DICTIONARY 927 (1981). 
64. "Confabulate" is defined as to talk informally; to chat. THE AMERICAN HER-
ITAGE DESK DICTIONARY 218 (1981). Confabulate means to fill in the gaps in 
memory to make the memory comprehensible. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 603 
(2d Cir. 1995). 
65. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 603 (2d Cir. 1995). "Memory hardening" 
causes enhanced confidence in the facts remembered, whether true or false. Id. 
66. Id. (quoting Bernard L. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial 
Hypnosis on a Prospectiue Witness, 68 CAL. L. REv. 313, 335 (1980». 
67. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 603 (2d Cir. 1995). A hypnotist may inten-
tionally or unintentionally give verbal or nonverbal cues to a subject, who then 
may incorporate that cue into the recalled memory. Suggestibility may be en-
hanced by the desire to make the hypnosis session successful thereby pleasing the 
hypnotist. Id. 
68. Id. The gaps are filled with irrelevant or unrelated facts and pure fantasy. 
As with susceptibility, confabulation can occur because of a desire to have com-
plete and comprehensible memories to please the hypnotist. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. This increased confidence is not indicative of the accuracy of the memo-
ry recalled through hypnosis and makes it more difficult for the jury or an expert 
to determine the credibility of the testimony. Id. 
10
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using hypnosis to refresh memory, individuals may lose the 
ability to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate memo-
ries.71 
B. APPROACHES TO THE QUESTION OF ADMISSIBILITY OF Hyp-
NOTICALLy-INDUCED TESTIMONY 
With these reliability problems in mind, courts generally 
follow one of four different approaches to the question of ad-
missibility of hypnotically-induced testimony: per se admissi-
bility, per se inadmissibility, the procedural safeguards theory, 
and the totality-of-the-circumstances theory.72 The Second 
Circuit examined each of these approaches.78 
1. Per se admissibility approach 
Some courts treat hypnotically-refreshed testimony as per 
se admissible under the theory that hypnosis goes to the ques-
tion of witness credibility, not witness competence.74 The 1968 
Maryland case, Harding v. State,76 followed this approach 
which permitted hypnotically-refreshed testimony resulting 
from hypnosis performed by a qualified professional. 76 
Admitting hypnotically-induced testimony without restric-
tion, even while informing the jury of the potential problems of 
71. [d. The subject becomes more prone to speculation than if the subject had 
relied on normal memory recall. This phenomenon may also result in "source am-
nesia" where the subject believes that a statement heard prior to hypnosis is a 
product of the subject's memory. [d. 
72. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 604-605 (2d Cir. 1995). 
73. [d. at 604-609. 
[d. See, e.g., Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1975) 
("That present memory depends upon refreshment claimed to have been induced 
under hypnosis goes to the credibility of [the witness'] testimony not to [the 
witness'] competence as a witness."). 
75. Harding v State, 246 A.2d 302 (Md. 1968). 
76. [d. This case involved a rape and shooting victim who recalled a more 
clear picture of the events surrounding her experience with the accused after un-
dergoing hypnosis. The court held that the testimony of the victim was sufficient 
to support the jury's verdict, since the hypnosis procedure was performed by a 
qualified professional under circumstances which leaned toward credibility. Al-
though this case is credited as being the fll'St to espouse the per se admissibility 
approach, the court's reasoning is remarkably similar to that used in determining 
admissibility under the procedural safeguards theory. For a discussion of the pro-
cedural safeguards theory, see infra notes 102-115. Id. 
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such testimony, creates the danger of having a lay jury specu-
late as to the consequences of the use of particular hypnosis 
techniques.77 The per se admissibility approach requires great 
faith in the jury's ability to accurately weigh the credibility of 
the previously hypnotized witness' testimony in light of cross-
examination, jury instructions, and expert testimony relating 
to hypnosis.78 However, popular misconceptions regarding the 
accuracy and reliability of hypnotically-refreshed memory may 
cause a jury to believe that hypnosis is a "panacea for lost 
memory.,,79 Consequently, the jury may disregard expert testi-
mony suggesting the inaccuracy and unreliability of hypnoti-
cally-induced testimony.8o The per se admissibility approach, 
therefore, could be inadequate to protect defendants in civil or 
criminal cases from unfounded charges.81 
Moreover, witnesses who have undergone hypnosis are 
virtually immune to effective cross examination due to memory 
hardening, suggestibility, or confabulation.82 Although the per 
se admissibility approach was popular when courts initially 
addressed the admissibility question, courts have increasingly 
disfavored this approach and have rarely followed it since 
1980.83 
2. Per se inadmissibility approach 
At the other end of the spectrum, some courts adopt the 
per se inadmissibility approach when considering hypnotically-
refreshed testimony, presuming that the witness is incompe-
tent to testify to such matters.54 Courts using this approach 
cite the possible distortion of memory due to hypnosis as im-
77. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 607 (2d Cir. 1995). 
78. [d. at 604. See also People v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513 (Ill. 1989). 
79. People v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513, 516 (Ill. 1989). 
80. [d. See also 27 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GoLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 6011 at 124, 127 (1990) [hereinafter WRIGHT & 
GoLD). 
81. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 607 (2d Cir. 1995). 
82. People v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513, 516 (Ill. 1989). 
83. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F. 3d 597, 604 (2d Cir. 1995). See also People v. 
Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513, 516 (Ill. 1989). 
84. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F. 3d 597, 604 (2d Cir. 1995). See also People v. 
Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982); People v. 
Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513, 516 (Ill. 1989). 
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possible to circumvent and so substantial that "the game is not 
worth the candle.,,85 Advocates of this approach deem the evi-
dence inadmissible, reasoning that no safeguards can ade-
quately ensure reliability.86 
Use of the per se inadmissibility approach avoids the prob-
lem of reliability altogether but ignores Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 601 which contains a presumption of witness compe-
tence.87 Further, per se exclusion risks the elimination of reli-
able testimony.88 
A landmark case construing this approach is People v. 
Shirley.89 This California Supreme Court case involved testi-
mony of a previously hypnotized witness regarding the events 
of the night she was allegedly raped.90 The court held that be-
cause hypnosis is so widely viewed as unreliable, the witness' 
testimony as to all matters relating to events remembered 
after the hypnosis was inadmissible.91 The Shirley court dis-
tinguished the Maryland decision in Harding by noting that 
analysis of the admissibility question in Harding simply reiter-
ated that hypnosis goes to the weight, and not to the admissi-
bility, of the testimony.92 
85. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 604 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing People v. Shir-
ley, 723 P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982». 
86. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 604 (2d Cir. 1995). 
87. Id. at 607. Federal Rule of Evidence 601 states: 
Every person is competent to be a witness except 
as otherwise provided in these rules. However, in civil 
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a 
claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule 
of decision, the competency of a witness shall be deter-
mined in accordance with State law. 
FED. R. EVID. 601. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 601 "abolished almost all grounds for witness 
disqualification based on new assumptions that took a more optimistic view of 
witness reliability and jury perceptiveness." WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 
124. 
88. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 607 (2d Cir. 1995). 
89. People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 
(1982). 
90. Id. 
9!. Id. at 1375. 
92. Id. at 1364. 
13
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Subsequent to early decisions involving hypnosis, courts 
began to acknowledge the dangers inherent in the use of hyp-
nosis to refresh memory.93 Although certain courts developed 
safeguards permitting the admission of such testimony,94 the 
Shirley court declared that no amount of safeguards could 
eliminate these dangers.95 Accordingly, the Shirley court ap-
plied the per se inadmissibility approach and did not allow 
hypnotically-induced testimony into evidence.96 
With regard to previously hypnotized criminal defendants, 
the United States Supreme Court ruled that Arkansas' per se 
inadmissibility rule was unconstitutiona1.97 In Rock v. Arkan-
sas,98 the Court acknowledged the problems involved in hyp-
nosis, but concluded that certain procedural safeguards could 
reduce the impact of potential problems.99 The Court held 
that per se inadmissibility was largely an "arbitrary" rule that 
violated a criminal defendant's right to testify on his or her 
own behalf.loo The Court explicitly limited its holding that 
93. [d. at 1364-65. These dangers include memory hardening, suggestibility, 
and confabulation. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text. 
94. For example, the Ninth Circuit suggested several safeguards for use in 
criminal cases to eliminate "potential for abuse." See United States v. Adams, 581 
F.2d 193, 198-199 (9th Cir. 1978). In United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 
(9th Cir. 1979), the court explained, in another footnote, that the purpose of the 
Adams safeguards is "to ensure that post-hypnosis statements are truly the 
subject's own recollections." Procedural safeguards continued to gain acceptance in 
other courts. See People v. Smrekar, 385 N.E.2d 848 (lll. 1979) (where the court 
held admissible the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness only because a 
number of factors in the record indicated reliability). The procedural safeguards 
theory became more elaborate and was finally enunciated as a test in State v. 
Hurd, 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981); see infra notes 102-115 and accompanying text. 
95. People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1365-1366 (Cal. 1982), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 860 (1982). 
96. [d. at 1366, 1386-87. 
97. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987). 
98. [d. Here, a criminal defendant was hypnotized in order to refresh her 
memory of the precise details of a shooting. [d. 
99. [d. at 49-53. The Supreme Court found that, like the truthfulness of other 
witnesses, the defendant's veracity regarding post-hypnotic testimony could be ade-
quately tested by cross-examination. [d. at 52. 
100. [d. at 51-53, 61. The Supreme Court, while not completely prepared to 
endorse the use of hypnosis as an investigative tool, stated that Arkansas had not 
justified the exclusion of the whole of a defendant's testimony that the defendant 
is unable to prove as being the product of pre-hypnosis memory. Further, the 
Court found that wholesale inadmissibility of a defendant's testimony is an "arbi-
trary restriction" on the right to testify in the absence of clear evidence by the 
State repudiating the validity of all post-hypnotic recollections. [d. 
14
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the per se inadmissibility approach is unconstitutional by re-
fusing to address the appropriate rule for a witness other than 
a previously hypnotized criminal defendant. 101 
3. Procedural safeguards approach 
The procedural safeguards approach, along with the totali-
ty-of-the-circumstances approach discussed infra, provides a 
middle ground for analyzing the admissibility question. l02 In 
particular, this approach attempts to account for the shortcom-
ings of the per se theories. lOa 
The New Jersey Supreme Court articulated the procedural 
safeguards theory in the seminal case of State v. Hurd. 104 The 
New Jersey Court established and required adherence to a 
certain set of safeguards to ensure reliability of hypnotically-
refreshed memories before admission of the testimony.105 Ac-
cording to the court's opinion, the inflexible rule of per se inad-
missibility allowed the possibility of excluding evidence equally 
as trustworthy as eyewitness testimony.106 
In order to allow testimony based on hypnotically-re-
freshed memories, the court adopted several procedural safe-
guards. l07 First, a psychologist or psychiatrist experienced in 
the use of hypnosis must conduct the hypnosis session. lOS 
Second, the hypnotist should be independent of, and not regu-
larly employed by, either party to the action.109 Third, any 
information given to the hypnotist by the parties or by law en-
101. [d. at 58 n.15. 
102. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 605 (2d Cir. 1995). 
103. [d. 
104. 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981). 
105. [d. at 96-97. 
106. [d. at 94. 
107. [d. at 96-97. The court adopted these requirements on the suggestion of 
Dr. Martin Orne, a renowned expert witness in the area of hypnosis. The court 
stated that "fb)efore [a party) may introduce hypnotically-refreshed testimony, the 
party must demonstrate compliance with these requirements. D [d. at 96. 
108. [d. at 96. The hypnotist should also be qualified as an expert to aid the 
trier of fact in evaluating the procedures used in the session. [d. 
109. State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981). This safeguard attempts to ensure 
that bias does not motivate the professional to ask leading questions or engage in 
other suggestive conduct with the subject. [d. 
15
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forcement officials prior to the hypnosis session must be re-
corded. 110 Fourth, a detailed record of any pre-hypnosis mem-
ories elicited from the subject must exist before hypnosis be-
gins. 111 Fifth, all contact between the subject and the hypno-
tist during the hypnosis session must be recorded. 112 Sixth, 
during all phases of the hypnosis, from the pre-hypnosis inter-
view to any post-hypnotic discussion, only the hypnotist and 
the subject may be present.113 
The Hurd court further required the assessment of the 
reliability, and consequently the admissibility, of such testimo-
ny according to a non-exclusive list of considerations. 114 
These considerations include the type of memory loss that the 
hypnosis restored as well as the specific technique used, 
whether the m~mory loss is likely to result in normal recall if 
hypnosis is properly used, and whether the witness has any 
discernible motivation for remembering a false version of 
events. 115 
4. Totality-of-the-circumstances approach 
The totality-of-the-circumstances approach is the theory 
most often used by the federal courts in cases that examine the 
admissibility of hypnotically-induced testimony.116 This flexi-
110. [d. at 96. This safeguard helps the court determine the type of information 
the hypnotist could have given to the subject during the session either directly or 
through suggestion. [d. 
111. [d. With this description, the hypnotist can avoid influencing the facts as 
the subject remembered them before hypnosis and can also avoid adding new de-
tails. [d. 
112. [d. at 97. With this safeguard, a record will exist of the pre-hypnosis in-
terview, the hypnotic session itself, and the post-hypnotic discussion. This record 
will enable the trier of fact to determine the reliability of the procedures used 
during the sessions. [d. 
113. [d. Although other people more familiar with the situation may be better 
able to conduct some of the questioning, the risk of unacceptable questions result-
ing in suggestibility is high. [d. 
114. State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 95-96 (N.J. 1981). 
115. [d. at 97. Several courts have followed the Hurd safeguard theory or a 
theory modeled on the Hurd factors. See House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815, 826-827 
(Miss. 1984); State v. Weston, 475 N.E.2d 805, 813 (Ohio 1984). 
116. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 605 (2d Cir. 1995). See also WRIGHT & 
GoLD, supra note 80, at 171-73. Cases following the totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach include McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 944 (1987); Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1986) cert. de-
nied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986); Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112 
16
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ble approach to the admissibility question avoids the rigidity of 
the other approaches. ll7 In particular, this approach focuses 
on the issue of reliability, and therefore admissibility, of the 
proffered hypnotically-induced testimony.118 
The totality-of-the-circumstances approach allows a judge 
to examine all relevant circumstances that affect reliabili-
ty.119 The approach requires a factual inquiry into the hypno-
sis procedures used to evaluate reliability.120 Corroborating 
evidence, if present, must be examined to further balance the 
effect of the testimony that results from hypnosis. 121 In addi-
tion, the court must assess the purpose of the hypnosis, the 
possibility of pre-hypnotic suggestions, the presence of a per-
manent record of the session, the qualifications of the hypno-
tist, the subject's susceptibility to hypnosis, and the expert 
testimony regarding reliability. 122 The court should weigh 
these factors when exercising its discretion whether to admit 
the hyPnotically-induced testimony.123 
The totality-of-the-circumstances approach is preferable to 
the strict procedural safeguards theory because the presence or 
absence of procedural safeguards may not always mitigate the 
problems associated with hypnotically-induced testimony, such 
as suggestibility, confabulation, and memory hardening.124 If 
the court applies the procedural safeguard approach, hypnosis 
may take on an "aura of reliability" which may mislead the 
jury to disregard the potential dangers. 125 A finding of the 
presence of the Hurd procedural safeguards does not compel 
admission' of hypnotically-induced testimony and, conversely, a 
finding of the absence of the safeguards does not require the 
(8th Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986). 
117. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 607 (2d Cir. 1995). 
118. [d. 
119. [d. at 608. 
120. [d. 
121. [d. 
122. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 608 (2d Cir. 1995). Essentially the 
Borawick court followed approaches used by the Fourth Circuit in McQueen v. 
Garrison, 814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1987) and by the Eighth Circuit in 
Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985). 
123. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 608 (2d Cir. 1995). 
124. [d. at 607. 
125. [d. (quoting WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 169-170). 
17
Topham: Hypnotically-Induced Memories
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997
440 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:423 
conclusion that the hypnotically-induced testimony is unre-
liable. 126 
Although federal courts recognize the benefits of the Hurd 
procedural safeguards, many conclude that courts should have 
discretion to balance all factors in determining the reliability of 
hypnotically-refreshed testimony, including weighing such 
testimony's probative value against its prejudicial effect. 127 
The Hurd guidelines generally represent the type of inquiry 
into reliability which is required, but a court need not auto-
matically rely on these safeguards to determine admissibili-
ty.128 Even if all of the Hurd safeguards are satisfied, a party 
may still demonstrate by expert testimony that hypnosis dis-
torted a witness' memory.129 On the other hand, even when 
flawed hypnosis procedures exist, a court may decide that a 
witness' testimony was, nonetheless, not affected by the dan-
gers associated with hypnosis. 1so 
By following the totality-of-the-circumstances theory, the 
Borawick court avoided the inflexibility associated with per se 
approaches. 1S1 The court determined that per se rules of in-
clusion or exclusion were "too blunt a tool" with which to ad-
dress concerns regarding the admissibility of hypnotically-re-
freshed testimony.132 Ultimately, the Second Circuit relied on 
the totality-of-the-circumstances theory to evaluate the admis-
sibility of Borawick's testimony.13s 
126. [d. at 607. The Second Circuit found that even if hypnosis procedures are 
flawed, a trial court may still find indicia of reliability sufficiently independent of 
the dangers associated with hypnosis. [d. at 608. (citing McQueen v. Garrison, 814 
F.2d 951, 958 (4th Cir. 1987». 
127. [d. at 605. The Second Circuit adopted this theory of admissibility after 
examination of the other three approaches. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 
1995). 
128. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 606 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing McQueen v. 
Garrison, 814 F.2d 951, 958 (4th Cir. 1987) (referring to Bernard Diamond, [nher~ 
ent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CAL. L. 
REv. 313 (1980». 
129. McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951, 958 (4th Cir. 1987). 
130. [d. 
131. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 609 (2d Cir. 1995). 
132. [d. at 607. 
133. [d. at 607-608. 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss3/8
1997] HYPNOTICALLY-INDUCED MEMORIES 441 
v. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Second Circuit began its analysis of Borawick by ac-
knowledging that it presented a case of first impression in the 
Circuit.134 Although state and federal courts had previously 
considered the issue of admissibility of testimony of memories 
elicited as a result of hypnosis, nearly all of these cases dealt 
with the issue in the context of hypnosis specifically, intended 
to enhance a memory of a particular known or suspected occur-
rence. 135 Borawick, however, addressed the issue of whether a 
court should admit testimony about memories of childhood 
sexual abuse recalled for the first time in adulthood as a result 
of hypnosis administered as part of a general psychotherapy 
session.136 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT'S APPROACH USING MANDATORY SAFE-
GUARDS 
The district court approached the issue of admissibility of 
hypnotically-induced testimony by evaluating the facts of 
Borawick's case in light of specific procedural safeguards.137 
These safeguards necessitated a showing that the hypnotist 
possessed the appropriate qualifications, avoided adding ele-
ments to the subject's recollections during hypnosis, and made 
available a permanent record of the hypnosis sessions.138 An 
additional safeguard required that the hypnotically-induced 
. testimony be accompanied by corroborating evidence.139 
In evaluating Borawick's testimony according to these 
safeguards, the district court found that although the evidence 
did not show that St. Regis added anything to Borawick's rec-
ollections, he lacked proper qualifications as a hypnotist. 140 
Further, St. Regis could not produce a record of the hypnosis 
134. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 598 (2d Cir. 1995). 
135. [d. at 600. See supra note 7. 
136. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 600 (2d Cir. 1995). 
137. Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1505 (D. Conn. 1994). See also State 
v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 95-96 (N.J. 1981). 
138. [d. at 1505. 
139. [d. 
140. [d. at 1507-1509. 
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sessions.141 At this stage, the court did not decide the ques-
tion of corroborating evidence. 142 The cornerstone of the 
court's decision to grant the in limine motion excluding 
Borawick's testimony of sexual abuse was St. Regis' lack of 
appropriate qualifications.143 
B. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S REVIEW OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
DECISION: THE TOTALITY-OF-THE-CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH 
The Second Circuit found the procedural safeguards ap-
proach, which the district court extracted from Hurd, to be too 
rigid.1« After reviewing the possible approaches to the ad-
missibility of hypnotically-refreshed testimony,145 the Second 
Circuit settled on the more flexible totality-of-the-circum-
stances approach as the most appropriate because it avoided 
the strict admissibility rules of the alternative approaches. 146 
The Second Circuit provided two rationales for choosing 
the totality-of-the-circumstances approach. 147 First, reliance 
on procedural safeguards as the sole criteria of admissibility 
may not sufficiently illustrate the problems associated with 
hypnosis. 148 In particular, a simple set of safeguards may 
give hypnotically-refreshed testimony an "aura of reliability" in 
the eyes of the jury.149 Second, relying on the Fourth Circuit's 
decision in McQueen v. Garrison/50 the Second Circuit ac-
knowledged the drawbacks of the procedural safeguards theo-
ry.151 The McQueen court reasoned that although the safe-
guards are relevant to whether the hypnotically-induced testi-
141. [d. 
142. Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1508 n.15. (D. Conn. 1994). 
143. [d. at 1507-1509. 
144. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 607 (2d Cir. 1995). The Second Circuit 
reviewed the district court's grant of the in limine motion under a de novo stan-
dard. [d. at 601. 
145. See supra notes 72-133 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ap-
proaches to the admissibility of hypnotically-induced testimony. The four approach-
es to admissibility include per se admissibility, per se inadmissibility, the proce-
dural safeguards theory, and the totality-of-the-circumstances theory. 
146. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 607-608 (2d Cir. 1995). 
[d. at 607-608. 
148. [d. at 607. 
149. [d. See also WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 169-170. 
150. 814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1987). 
151. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 605-606 (2d Cir. 1995). 
20
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss3/8
1997] HYPNOTICALLY-INDUCED MEMORIES 443 
mony is properly admitted, admissibility must not rest exclu-
sively on the reliability of the procedures used in hypnosis. 152 
That court explained that notwithstanding the presence of all 
safeguards, a party may still use expert testimony to demon-
strate that hypnosis distorted a witness' memory. 153 The 
McQueen court further reasoned that if flawed hypnosis proce-
dures exist, a court might nonetheless find through other cor-
roborating evidence that the witness' testimony is sufficiently 
removed from the dangers associated with hypnosis and is 
therefore admissible. 154 
An Eighth Circuit decision, Sprynczynatyk v. General Mo-
tors Corp.,155 supports the Fourth Circuit's decision in 
McQueen. 156 In Sprynczynatyk, the Eighth Circuit instructed 
district courts, in cases involving hypnosis, to conduct pretrial 
hearings on procedures used during hypnosis sessions to assess 
the effect of hypnosis on the reliability of the associated testi-
mony.157 Although the Sprynczynatyk court adopted the Hurd 
safeguards in its analysis, it limited district courts to a <;leter-
mination regarding the degree to which hypnotists followed the 
safeguards.15s The court's analysis of the admissibility ques-
tion continued with consideration of several extrinsic fac-
tors.159 Finally, it directed district courts to determine, on a 
case-by-case basis and "in view of all the circumstances," 
whether the proposed testimony is sufficiently reliable. l60 In 
effect, courts must determine whether the risk that the testi-
mony reflects a distorted memory is so great that the probative 
152. McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951, 958 (4th Cir. 1987). 
153. [d. 
154. [d. 
155. 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985). 
156. [d. 
157. [d. at 1122-23. The proponent of the hypnotically-enhanced testimony bears 
the burden of proof during this proceeding. [d. at 1123. 
158. [d. at 1123. 
159. [d. These factors include the appropriateness of using hypnosis for the 
kind of memory loss involved and whether any evidence exists to corroborate the 
hypnotically-refreshed testimony. [d. 
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value of the testimony is destroyed. 161 
The Borawick court followed the flexible approach used in 
the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, consisting of an examination 
of non-exclusive factors based on all relevant circumstanc-
es. 162 This examination embodies the totality-of-the-circum-
stances approach. 163 Determination of the admissibility of 
hypnotically-refreshed testimony requires balancing these 
factors on a case-by-case basis. l64 
1. Non-Exclusive Factors 
After deciding on the totality-of-the-circumstances ap-
proach to analyze the question of the admissibility of hypnoti-
cally-refreshed testimony in Borawick, the Second Circuit sug-
gested a non-exclusive list of factors for a district court to 
weigh on a case-by-case basis when ruling on admissibility.165 
These factors, while more refined and not mandatory, resemble 
the procedural safeguards enunciated in Hurd. 166 
A court should consider whether the refreshed memory 
concerns a known public event experienced by the subject or 
whether it is refreshed, albeit not deliberately, as a result of 
therapy.167 A court should also consider whether, before or 
during the hypnosis, the hypnotist made any extraneous sug-
gestions regarding the subject of hypnosis which may have 
become part of the witness' memory.16S Further, a court 
should consider the presence or absence of a permanent record 
of the hypnosis sessions to ascertain whether the hypnotist 
161. [d. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the evidentiary problem created by hypo 
nosis is directly within the control of the district courts. The district court, not the 
jury, has authority to make a preliminary determination of admissibility as it does 
with other evidentiary questions. [d. 
162. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 608 (2d Cir. 1995). The Fourth Circuit 
decision is McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951, 958 (4th Cir. 1987). The decision 
from the Eighth Circuit is Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112 
(8th Cir. 1985). 
163. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.2d 597, 607·608 (2d Cir. 1995). 
164. [d. at 608. 
165. [d. 
166. [d. See also State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 96·97 (N.J. 1981). 
167. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 608 (2d Cir. 1995). 
168. [d. 
22
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used reliable procedures.169 Also, a court should consider the 
hypnotist's qualifications. 170 Additionally, the court should 
weigh any corroborating evidence that tends to support the 
reliabili ty of the hypnotically-refreshed memories.171 Further, 
evidence of the subject's ability to be hypnotized may be rele-
vant.172 A court should also consider any expert evidence of-
fered by the parties as to the reliability of the procedures used 
by the hypnotist. 173 Lastly, a court should hold a pretrial evi-
dentiary hearing to enable the parties to present expert evi-
dence and to test credibility through cross-examination.174 
The Second Circuit held that while exercising its discretion 
whether to admit the post-hypnotic testimony, the trial court 
should weigh the factors in favor and against the reliability of 
the hypnosis procedure.175 The party seeking to admit the 
hypnotically-refreshed testimony has the burden of persuading 
the district court that the factors lean toward admissibility.176 
2. Conclusion of the Borawick Court 
The Second Circuit found the district court's approach to 
the admissibility question too rigid because it did not ade-
quately address the problems associated with hypnotically-
induced testimony and because it created a risk of exclusion of 
reliable testimony. 177 Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the 
district court's ruling on the in limine motion to exclude 
Borawick's hypnotically-induced testimony.178 The appellate 
court used the totality-of-the-circumstances theory to exclude 
Borawick's testimony of childhood sexual abuse. 179 The per-
ceived incredibility of Borawick's allegations further 








176. [d. at 608-609. See also State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 97 (N.J. 1981). 
177. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 607-608 (2d Cir. 1995). 
178. [d. at 609. 
179. [d. 
180. ld. Borawick made far-fetched and wild accusations against many people, 
23
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The Second Circuit acknowledged that St. Regis lacked 
appropriate qualifications as a hypnotist. 181 Although 
Borawick and Dr. Peters stated that they considered St. Regis 
to be fully qualified, the Court noted that his education ended 
in high school and that he had no formal training in psychiatry 
or psychotherapy.182 In addition, the Court emphasized that 
St. Regis kept no permanent record of his sessions with 
Borawick and did not provide any written explanation of the 
procedures he used. 183 As a result, the Second Circuit ac-
knowledged that the district court had no means to evaluate 
whether St. Regis made suggestive remarks to Borawick, possi-
bly affecting her recollections during hypnosis.l84 
Finally, the Court noted that, prior to testifying, St. Regis 
read portions of Borawick's deposition transcript. 185 This 
caused the Second Circuit to doupt St. Regis because of the 
possibility that his testimony may simply have reflected his 
reading of Borawick's deposition rather than his true experi-
ence.186 
Borawick presented corroborating evidence in support of 
her allegations, including letters in which Borawick's sister 
recounted her own experiences with childhood sexual 
abuse. 187 However, the Second Circuit found this evidence too 
weak to overcome the strong evidence against admissibili-
ty.l88 For the foregoing reasons, the Second Circuit held that 
the totality-of-the-circumstances theory barred Borawick from 
testifying regarding her memories of sexual abuse. 1S9 
some familiar to her and some unfamiliar. These allegations, including sexual 
abuse by men whom Borawick believed were members of the Masons as well as 
rituals involving dead pigs and people dressed in black robes, reinforced the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision to exclude her testimony. [d. 
181. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 607-609 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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C. APPLYING THE DAUBERT STANDARD FOR ADMISSION OF SCI-
ENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
After affirming the in limine motion excluding Borawick's 
testimony, the Second Circuit gave cursory consideration to 
Borawick's argument that the Supreme Court's recent decision 
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals190 rendered her 
testimony admissible. 191 In Daubert, the Supreme Court ruled 
that a judge should undertake a preliminary evaluation of 
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimo-
ny is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning and 
methodology properly can be applied to the facts at issue.192 
Pertinent factors include whether the scientific theory in evi-
dence could be tested, whether it had been subjected to peer 
review and publication in the scientific community, whether 
the known or potential rate of error is considerable, whether 
the controls used were adequate, and whether the theory had 
gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific communi-
ty.193 
The Second Circuit held that the Daubert decision did not 
apply directly to the instant case because Daubert created 
standards addressed to the admissibility of data derived from 
scientific techniques or expert opinions. l94 By contrast, the 
Borawick court was concerned with the question of whether 
the plaintiff was a competent witness and whether her testi-
mony was admissible. 195 
190. 509 u.S. 579 (1993). 
191. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 610 (2d Cir. 1995). 
192. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592-593 (1993). 
This duty of assessment derives from the Federal Rules of Evidence, especially 
Rule 702. [d. at 595. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 reads: 
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or educa-
tion may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
FED. R. EVID. 702. 
193. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 593-594 (1993). 
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Although the Second Circuit held that Daubert did not 
directly apply, the court maintained that its position was con-
sistent with the Daubert decision.196 In Daubert, the Supreme 
Court articulated a system by which a court rules on the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence by weighing various consider-
ations on a case-specific basis. 197 Further, Daubert provides 
for admission of expert scientific testimony, regardless of 
whether it is generally accepted, if its reliability can be suffi-
ciently demonstrated.19s If Borawick had presented some in-
dicia of reliability regarding the methods used in and the re-
sults of her hypnosis, the Second Circuit might have been more 
sympathetic to her Daubert-based argument. 199 
VI. CRITIQUE 
The Borawick decision is important because it addresses 
the admissibility of memories induced through clinical hypno-
sis as a part of psychotherapy, a use of hypnosis not widely 
considered by other courts.200 Previously, courts primarily 
considered testimony resulting from forensic hypnosis used to 
enhance memory of a specific event.201 Generally, courts and 
parties have failed to recognize the differences between these 
uses of hypnosis. 202 
A. COURTS SHOULD UTILIZE DIFFERENT EVIDENTIARY STAN-
DARDS DEPENDING ON THE PuRPOSE OF THE HYPNOSIS 
Forensic and clinical hypnotists use similar memory en-
hancing techniques to attain different ends.203 The forensic 
hypnotist uses hypnosis to retrieve specific memories which 
will be helpful in reconstructing the past in a legal proceed-
ing.204 A clinical hypnotist uses hypnosis to better understand 




199. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 610 (2d Cir. 1995). 
200. Borawick V. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 600 (2d Cir. 1995). 
201. [d. See supra note 7. 
202. Kanovitz, supra note 10, at 1192 n.17. 
203. [d. at 1217. 
204. [d. at 1217-18. 
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serve those memories for litigation.205 Accordingly, the 
clinical hypnotist runs a greater risk of emotional involvement 
in the subject's recovery and, therefore, may overstep the 
boundaries of interviewing neutrality. 206 Since the forensic 
hypnotist approaches hypnosis with litigation in mind, he or 
she can more easily avoid giving direction to the hypnotized 
subject that would interfere with original memories.207 With 
this focus, the forensic hypnotist may maintain an emotional 
distance from the subject and not influence the emerging mem-
ory.208 
The diverse approaches used by hypnosis professionals 
indicate the need for standards concerning admissibility of 
such testimony based on the purpose of the hypnosis. Clinical 
hypnotists are often not well informed about the legal implica-
tions of a hypnosis session conducted in a relaxed manner. 209 
Therefore, memories recalled in the clinical setting have a 
greater risk of contamination from suggestibility, confabula-
tion, and memory hardening.210 Conversely, forensic hypno-
tists may realize the legal implications of inaccurate or unbe-
lievable memories.211 These hypnotists usually do not reveal 
any expectations to the subject in advance of the session or ask 
the subject leading questions.212 
Ai; a result of the diverse approaches used by hypnotists, 
testimony resulting from forensic hypnosis, used to recall a 
specific event, may be more reliable and therefore should enjoy 
greater weight on the issue of admissibility. Memories recalled 
during clinical therapy for other reasons should be subject to 
205. [d. at 1218. 
206. [d. Leading questions and suggestions can slip into a clinical hypnotist's 
session without the awareness of the hypnotist because of this emotional attach-
ment. The interview becomes more automatic than carefully orchestrated to pre-
serve accurate memories. [d. at 1218-19. 
207. Kanovitz, supra note 10, at 1217-18. 
208. [d. at 1218. 
209. [d. at 1218 n.141. Clinical hypnotists can be ignorant of the potential of 
hypnosis to change memory. Consequently, clinical literature is beginning to inform 
these therapists about the legal ramifications of hypnosis and to recommend inte-
grating specified forensic procedural safeguards into hypnotic therapy sessions. 
Some writers suggest videotaping the clinical hypnosis session. [d. at 1218 n.141. 
210. [d. See supra notes 62-71. 
211. Kanovitz, supra note 10, at 1217-18. 
212. [d. at 1219. 
27
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greater scrutiny before admission. 
B. PROBLEMS AsSOCIATED WITH USE OF A TOTALITY-OF-THE-
CIRCUMSTANCES TEST TO DETERMINE ADMISSIBILITY OF Hyp-
NOTICALLY -INDUCED TESTIMONY 
The totality-of-the-circumstances test provides an equita-
ble forum in which to consider issues of reliability and admissi-
bility because evaluating admissibility of hypnotically-induced 
testimony should warrant different evidentiary standards. 
These considerations should include an inquiry into the con-
text, forensic or clinical, in which the subject recalls memories. 
However, the totality-of-the-circumstances test contains several 
problems, including witness competency, judicial discretion and 
detection of suggestibility and confabulation, which a court 
should bear in mind when balancing factors to determine ad-
missibility. 
1. Witness competency 
Witness competency presents the first problem. Historical-
ly, American courts were reluctant to admit testimony uncov-
ered by hypnosis.213 In fact, the California Supreme Court in 
1897 stated that "the law of the United States does not recog-
nize hypnotism.,,214 Currently, courts fail to apply uniform 
rules to the admission of hypnotically-induced testimony.215 
Most courts find a previously hypnotized witness competent if 
the witness' testimony is based on a hypnotically-refreshed 
recollection.216 Some courts prohibit testimony from a witness 
who does not have an independent recollection of the events 
described but who merely testified concerning memories ex-
plored and revealed under hypnosis.217 Other courts bar testi-
mony by a previously-hypnotized witness when the hypnotist 
used suggestive procedures. 218 
213. R.T.C., The Admissibility of Testimony Influenced by Hypnosis, 67 VA. L. 
REv. 1203, 1204 (1981) [hereinafter R.T.C.). 
214. Id. (citing People v. Ebanks, 49 P. 1049, 1053 (1897». 
215. R.T.C., supra note 213, at 1204. 
216. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 885 (1979). 
217. R.T.C., supra note 213, at 1205. See also State v. Mena, 624 P.2d 1274 
(Ariz. 1981). 
218. R.T.C., supra note 213, at 1205. See also State v. Hurd, 414 A.2d 291 
28
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Federal Rule of Evidence 601, however, contains a strong 
presumption in favor of witness competency.219 The Rule pre-
sumes that cross-examination, the oath and the jury's opportu-
nity to observe a witness first-hand are sufficient safeguards 
against unreliable testimony.22o 
However, judges in some cases have concluded that Rule 
601 leaves them with the discretion to disqualify witnesses 
with limited mental or moral capacities.221 In decisions fol-
lowing the enactment of Rule 601, courts have conducted com-
petency hearings and psychiatric evaluations although the 
Rule seemingly eliminated these powers.222 As a result, most 
courts treat witness competency issues as they did before the 
(N.J. 1980). 
219. Federal Rule of Evidence 601 states: 
Every person is competent to be a witness except 
as otherwise provided in these rules. However, in civil 
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a 
claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule 
of decision, the competency of a witness shall be deter-
mined in accordance with State law. 
FED. R. Evm. 601. 
The advisory committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence characterized the 
Rule as a "general ground clearing," eliminating almost all categories of witness 
competency which operated as a bar to testifying at common law. FED. R. EVID. 
601 Advisory Committee's notes. 
220. See generally WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 127. ("The only effect the 
oath can have, then, is to misleadingly cloak the testimony in the ceremonial garb 
of truthfulness"). See State ex reI Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 1266, 1274 
(Ariz. 1982) (where a witness sincerely believes the truth of his or her memories, 
he or she will become immune to effective impeachment through cross-examina-
tion); State v. Martin, 684 P.2d 651, 656 (Wash. 1984) ("the subjective conviction 
in the truth of the memory ... eliminates fear of perjury as a factor ensuring reliable 
testimony"). But see Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987) (even in the case of 
a confident defendant, cross-examination is an effective tool for revealing inconsis-
tencies). 
221. Victor J. Gold, Do the Federal Rules of Evidence Matter?, 25 LOy. L.A. L. 
REv. 909, 911 (1992). 
222. 1d. See also United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 111 (4th Cir. 1984) (a 
district judge has "great latitude in the procedure he may follow in determining 
the competency of a witness to testify."). 
29
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enactment of Rule 601.223 
In cases involving previously-hypnotized subjects, experts 
can advise the jury regarding the inherent problems associated 
with hypnosis.224 Unfortunately, the jury is in a poor position 
to weigh the testimony in light of those problems because nei-
ther the hypnotist nor the subject can separate the real memo-
ry from confabulation or memories resulting from sugges-
tion.225 
Some courts have adopted a modified ·per se witness in-
competency approach to determine the admissibility ofhypnoti-
cally-induced testimony.226 Under this approach, the witness 
is incompetent to testify except as to matters recalled prior to 
hypnosis.227 Some courts acknowledge, however, that even 
pre-hypnosis testimony may be adversely affected by subse-
quent hypnosis due to increased confidence in memory over-
all.228 The danger of hypnosis tainting pre-hypnosis memories 
seems greatest in the clinical setting due to possible emotional 
attachment of the hypnotist to the subject.229 For this reason, 
courts should examine the competence of clinical hypnosis 
subjects more closely even in light of Rule 601. Forensic hypno-
sis does not seem to present the same difficulties because the 
procedures used are carefully tailored for use in litigation. 
223. Victor J. Gold, Do the Federal Rules of Evidence Matter?, 25 LOY. L.A. L. 
REv. 909, 911 (1992). See supra note 219 for Advisory Committee comment to Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 601. The supreme court of at least one state has found that 
where a witness's testimony has been tainted due to hypnosis, the trial court has 
discretion to determine whether the witness is competent to testify as to matters 
untainted by the hypnosis. State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571, 579 (Idaho 1984). 
224. WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 127. These problems include suggest-
ibility, confabulation, and memory hardening; see supra notes 62-71 and accompa-
nying text. 
225. [d. at 128. 
226. [d. at 128-29. 
227. [d. See also People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1384 (Cal. 1982), cert. denied 
459 U.S. 860 (1982). 
228. WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 130. 
229. Kanovitz, supra note 10, at 1218. See supra notes 203-212 and accompany-
ing text. 
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2. Judicial discretion 
A second problem with the totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach comes from the "unprincipled" discretion exercised in 
the application of the balancing test.230 The balancing test 
may invite courts to spend insufficient time weighing both 
sides to reach an equitable conclusion.231 Since the test is 
subjective, a judge may not properly review all the evidence 
bearing on reliability.232 The judge's decision on admissibility 
may have more to do with which party presented the evidence 
rather than its reliability.233 
In at least one case, a state supreme court advocated def-
erence to the trial court record to determine the reliability of 
hypnotically-induced testimony and consequently avoided this 
problem.234 In People v. Romero, the court considered whether 
a previously-hypnotized witness' trial testimony was sufficient-
ly reliable and therefore admissible.235 The trial court in that 
case used a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to deter-
mine reliability.236 The state supreme court accepted the find-
ings made by the trial court with respect to reliability and held 
that the record adequately supported the trial court's decision 
to admit testimony from previously hypnotized witnesses.237 
A court using the Romero approach avoids the problem of 
unprincipled judicial discretion on the part of a higher court by 
accepting the trial court record. A trial court has a better op-
230. WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 175. See Victor J. Gold, Limiting Judi-
cial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 59, 61 
(1984) (The grant of discretion contained in Rule 403 has been taken by the courts 
as "license for an unprincipled, ad hoc approach to each case. Most courts are con-
tent to conclude evidence has probative value or is unfairly prejudicial without 
considering the meaning of those terms. "). 
231. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 80, at 175. 
232. Id. See also Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations in 
the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REv. 497, 500-501 (1983) 
(most courts "utterly fail to conduct the required balancing test, or while purport-
ing to balance, give no hint as to how or why a particular balance was struck"). 
233. WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 175. 
234. People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003, 1017-18 (Colo. 1987), cert. denied 485 
U.S. 990 (1988). 
235. Id. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 1018. 
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portunity to view witnesses first-hand and to make individual-
ized factual inquiries in each case to determine reliability and 
admissibility. Review by a higher court can then be under an 
abuse of discretion standard. 
3. Detection of suggestion and confabulation 
Under the totality-of-the-circumstances approach to admis-
sibility, a fact finder weighs the effectiveness and thoroughness 
of the procedures used during hypnosis. However, the fact 
finder may never detect the presence of suggestion, confabula-
tion, or memory hardening.238 Estimation of the presence of 
these phenomena is speculative at best and may be completely 
wrong, possibly violating a party's due process and confronta-
tion rights by admission of unreliable hypnotically-induced 
testimony. 239 
This third problem, however, is not unique to hypnotically-
induced testimony.24o For example, a witness could be suscep-
tible to suggestion from his or her lawyer, from family mem-
bers or from the media. Even idle conversation with another 
witness concerning the same event can lead to an alteration of 
a witness' memory.241 Although the possibility of alteration of 
memory from hypnosis is greater than the possibility of alter-
ation from talking to another witness, it remains a question of 
degree.242 Since the modification of a witness' memory is not 
accurately measurable, a balancing test is necessarily 
inexact.243 Indeed, using Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 403, 
a court balances prejudicial value against probative value for 
all types of evidence.244 
238. WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 174. See also Bernard Diamond, Inher-
ent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CALIF. 
L. REv. 313, 337 (1980). ("No one, regardless of experience, can verify the accuracy 
of the hypnotically enhanced memory"). Id. 
239. WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 174. 
240. [d. 
241. State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571, 579 (Idaho 1984). 
242. [d. 
243. WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 174. 
244. Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 403 states: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
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Suggestion, confabulation and memory hardening are 
impossible to detect with certainty. Therefore, hypnotically-
induced testimony should be subject to the balancing test pro-
vided by Rule 403 to the best of the court's ability. 
In conclusion, the totality-of-the-circumstances test does 
not constitute a completely effective method for handling the 
problems of witness competency, judicial discretion, and detec-
tion of suggestibility and confabulation. Nonetheless, the totali-
ty-of-the-circumstances test remains a viable basis for deter-
mining admissibility of hypnotically-induced testimony. Howev-
er, the test should be refined to better accommodate these 
concerns. 
C. A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO REMEDY THE INADEQUACY OF 
THE TOTALITY -OF-THE-CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH 
The traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test contains 
a significant inadequacy in that the test neglects consideration 
of the subject's hypnotizability.u5 Instead, the test focuses 
almost exclusively on the problems of suggestibility, confabula-
tion and memory hardening; thereby ignoring the reality that a 
subject's hypnotizability presents another important problem 
with the reliability of hypnotically-induced testimony. 
No more than 10 to 15 percent of the population is highly 
hypnotizable.246 In conducting research with these subjects, 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
FED. R. Evm. 403. 
245. Kanovitz, supra note 10, at 1220, 1235 n.214. 
246. Kanovitz, supra note 10, at 1235 n.214. The author of this law review ar-
ticle asserts that hypnotizability is a "stable trait that can be measured." Id. at 
1220. She includes research into the susceptibility of highly hypnotizable subjects. 
An experiment, conducted by Laurence, Nadon, Nogrady and Perry, involved plant-
ing false memories into subjects especially selected for their high level of 
hypnotizability. Twenty-two percent of the subjects would accept a hypnotic memo-
ry transplant that they had been awakened by a loud bang on a particular night 
of the previous week. An additional 27 percent, who had previously been certain 
that they had slept through the night, were confused after the experiment about 
how well they had slept. The remaining 51 percent flatly rejected the attempt to 
alter their memory and stood by their initial sleep recollections. Attempts to repro-
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hypnotists successfully plant false memories that will carry 
over into waking state.247 These highly hypnotizable subjects 
have "spirited imaginations" and ''vivid powers of imagery.,,248 
They tend to fantasize a great deal of the time and are usually 
able to see, smell, and touch the things they fantasize. 249 
Highly hypnotizable people have intense powers of imagination 
and often mistake what they have read, seen or heard for their 
own experiences.260 Moreover, these subjects are able to slip 
into self-hypnotic states without awareness or effort.261 
Problems of memory elasticity, or a modification in memo-
ry, result from cognitive changes that take place during 
hypnosis.262 Cognitive changes occur according to 
hypnotizability.253 For example, evidence exists to show that 
only a highly hypnotizable subject is capable of experiencing 
hypnosis at levels which are deep enough to confuse events 
taking place in the mind with reality.2M Further, these highly 
hypnotizable subjects tend to be abnormally susceptible to 
suggestion.266 However, no conclusive evidence exists to es-
tablish that a hypnotist could successfully create "whole memo-
ries" of events never experienced by the subject.266 The fact 
remains, however, that highly hypnotizable subjects are more 
susceptible to the problems associated with hypnosis, especial-
duce results like these with subjects of normal hypnotizability have not been suc-
cessful. [d. at 1236 (discussing Laurence et aI., Duality, Dissociation and Memory 
Creation in Highly Hypnotizable Subjects, 34 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL 
HYPNOSIS 295 (1986». 
247. Kanovitz, supra note 10, at 1235 n.214. 
248. [d. 
249. [d. (citing EUGENE BLISS, MULTIPLE PERSONALITY, ALLIED DISORDERS AND 
HYPNOSIS 73-81 (Oxford, 1986) [hereinafter BLISS] and ERNEST HILGRAD, DIVIDED 
CONSCIOUSNESS: MULTIPLE CONTROLS IN HUMAN THOUGHT AND ACTION 88 (John 
Wiley & Sons, 1977) [hereinafter HILGRAD]). 
250. Kanovitz, supra note 10, at 1235 n.214. 
251. [d. 
252. [d. (citing BLISS, supra note 248, at 98-99 and HILGRAD, supra note 248, at 
163-65). The cognitive changes which may occur as a result of hypnosis are in-
creased responsiveness to suggestion, reduced critical judgment, increased capacity 
for fantasy formation, and diminished reality testing. [d. 
253. [d. 
254. [d. Memory hardening is a phenomenon which gives the subject enhanced 
confidence in the facts remembered, regardless of whether the facts are true or 
false. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 603 (2d Cir. 1995). 
255. Kanovitz, supra note 10, at 1235 n.214. 
256. [d. at 1236. 
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ly confabulation.257 
A more complete and accurate approach for courts to take 
when faced with the issue of admission of hypnotically-induced 
testimony would include an inquiry into the level of 
hypnotizability of the subjece58 as well as the context in 
which the hypnosis took place, the competency of the witness, 
the detection of suggestion or confabulation and the adequacy 
of the trial court's analysis of reliability. A previously adopted 
approach, such as the Hurd procedural safeguardE;! approach or 
the totality-of-the-circumstances test, best evaluates these 
inquiries. Trial courts could exclude hypnotically-induced testi-
mony from highly hypnotizable subjects.259 By excluding this 
group of witnesses, the court can be more confident that testi-
mony susceptible to the possibility of enhanced memory is 
eliminated as unreliable. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In Borawick v. Shay,260 the Second Circuit held that the 
admissibility of hypnotically-refreshed recollections should be 
determined on a case-by-case basis using the totality-of-the-
circumstances approach and considering non-exclusive fac-
tors.261 Using this approach, the court ruled that Borawick's 
hypnotically-induced memories of child sexual abuse, recalled 
through the use of hypnosis conducted by an unqualified hyp-
notist who kept no record of the hypnosis sessions, were inad-
missible.262 The Borawick decision marked the first time that 
the Second Circuit addressed the question of admissibility of 
hypnotically-refreshed testimony regarding childhood sexual 
abuse recalled after hypnosis conducted for therapeutic purpos-
es rather than after hypnosis conducted for the specific pur-
257. Id. at 1238. 
258. Id. 
259. "Hypnotic susceptibility testing can identify individuals who have the ca-
pacity to confuse fantasized events for real experiences." Kanovitz, supra note 10, 
at 1239 n.229. 
260. 68 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 1995). 
261. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 607-608 (2d Cir. 1995). 
262. Id. at 609-610. 
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pose of recalling such memories.263 Consequently, this deci-
sion seems to expand the opportunities for admission of testi-
mony recalled through clinical hypnosis, provided the totality-
of-the-circumstances leaned toward reliability. 
Kristy L. Topham· 
263. [d. at 600. 
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